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Abstract
Planning and execution of clinical research and publication of results should conform to
the highest ethical standards, given that human lives are at stake. However, economic in-
centives can generate conflicts of interest for investigators, who may be inclined to withhold
unfavorable results or even tamper with the data. Analyzing p-values reported to the Clini-
calTrials.gov registry with two different methodologies, we find suspicious patterns only for
results from trials conducted by smaller industry sponsors, with presumably less reputation
at stake. First, a density discontinuity test reveals an upward jump at the classical threshold
for statistical significance for Phase 3 results by small industry sponsors, suggesting some se-
lective reporting. Second, we find an excess mass of significant results in Phase 3 compared
to Phase 2. However, we can explain almost completely this excess mass for large industry
sponsors, once we account for the incentives to selectively continue research through a novel
technique linking trials across phases. In contrast, for trials sponsored by small pharmaceuti-
cal companies, selective continuation of trials economizing on research costs only explains one
third of the increase in the number of significant results from Phase 2 to Phase 3. The different
pattern depending on the type of sponsor suggests that reputational concerns can mitigate the
short-run economic incentives that undermine integrity in reporting results of clinical research.
Keywords: Clinical trials; Drug development; Selective reporting; p-Hacking; Economic in-
centives in research
∗Funding by the European Research Council through grant 295835 (EVALIDEA) is gratefully acknowledged. We
thank Marco Bonetti, Tarani Chandola, Sylvain Chassang, Francesco Decarolis, Edina Hot, John Ioannidis, Tony Tse,
and Deborah Zarin for helpful comments. All authors have contributed equally. The authors declare no competing
interests. A complete replication package is available upon request from the authors. This paper draws on Christian
Decker’s master thesis “P-Hacking in Clinical Trials?”, supervised by Marco Ottaviani and Je´roˆme Adda, and defended
on April 20, 2017 at Bocconi University.
†Department of Economics and IGIER, Bocconi University, Via Roberto Sarfatti 25, 20136 Milan, Italy. Phone:
+39–02–5836–5572. E-mail: jerome.adda@unibocconi.it.
‡Department of Economics, University of Zurich, Scho¨nberggasse 1, 8001 Zurich, Switzerland. Phone: +41–44–
634–61–26. E-mail: christian.decker@econ.uzh.ch.
§Department of Economics and IGIER, Bocconi University, Via Roberto Sarfatti 25, 20136 Milan, Italy. Phone:
+39–02–5836–3385. E-mail: marco.ottaviani@unibocconi.it.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
90
7.
00
18
5v
1 
 [e
co
n.G
N]
  2
9 J
un
 20
19
The evidence produced in clinical trials is susceptible to many kinds of biases [1–3]. While
some of these biases could occur accidentally, even unbeknownst to the investigators who carry
out the studies, other more egregious biases may result from strategic behavior of investigators and
sponsors. In addition to the public value of improving medical treatments, the information obtained
through clinical trials is privately valuable for the sponsoring pharmaceutical companies that aim
to demonstrate the safety and efficacy of newly developed drugs – the prerequisite for marketing
approval by authorities such as the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Given the sizeable
research and development costs involved [4] and the lure of large potential profits, investigators
end up suffering from conflicts of interest [5–8] and pressure to withhold or “beautify” unfavorable
results [9, 10] or even fabricate or falsify data [11].
In the 1990s and 2000s many medical scholars started calling for more transparency in clini-
cal research [12], following public outcry over alarming evidence of selective publication of trial
results [13–15], cases of premature drug approvals [16], and allegations of data withholding [17].
As a response to these concerns, policymakers established publicly accessible registries and result
databases [18, 19], such as ClinicalTrials.gov [20, 21] (see SI Appendix for more details on the
ClinicalTrials.gov registry and the legal requirements for reporting trial results).
ClinicalTrials.gov now contains sufficient data to allow for a systematic evaluation of the dis-
tribution of reported p-values. This is the first such analysis, building on the literature that inves-
tigates “p-hacking”, publication bias, and the “file-drawer problem”[22, 23] for academic journal
publications in a number of fields, including psychology [24, 25], political science [26, 27], and
economics [28–30].
Given the escalation of stakes as research progresses through phases, clinical trials are partic-
ularly well suited to detect how economic incentives of sponsoring parties drive research activity
[31–33] and reporting bias. While the previous literature focused mostly on scientific publica-
tions in academic journals for which pre-publication research results are typically not observable,
ClinicalTrials.gov allows us to observe results from clinical trials in earlier research phases. Thus,
we are able to follow the evolution of research results over time, and construct counterfactuals not
available in previous work. By linking trials across different phases of clinical research we are able
to quantify the effect of the incentives to selectively continue experimental research depending on
early-stage results.
Our focus is on pre-approval interventional superiority studies on drugs carried out as Phase
2 and Phase 3 trials. Trials in Phase 2 investigate drug safety and efficacy, typically with a small
sample of experimental subjects. Phase 3 trials investigate efficacy, while monitoring adverse ef-
fects on a larger sample of individuals, and play a central role in obtaining approval to market the
drug from regulators such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). To facilitate the analysis,
we transform the p-values back to test statistics, supposing that they would all originate from a
two-sided Z-test of a null hypothesis that the drug has the same effect as the comparison. This
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transformation allows us to investigate both the overall shape of the distribution and the region
around the thresholds for statistical significance more easily (see SI Appendix for further informa-
tion on the data and the p-z transformation).
The Distribution of z-Scores: Discontinuity Tests
Figure 1 displays density estimates of the constructed z-statistics for tests performed for primary
outcomes of Phase 2 and Phase 3 trials. We present results for all trials in panel A and then give the
break down by affiliation of the lead sponsor: non-industry in panel B (NIH, US federal agencies,
universities, etc.), top ten industry in panel C (the ten pharmaceutical companies in the sample
with largest revenues in 2016 [35]: Pfizer, Novartis, Roche, Merck & Co., Sanofi, Johnson &
Johnson, Gilead Sciences, GlaxoSmithKline, AbbVie, and Amgen), and small industry in panel D
(the remaining smaller pharmaceutical companies).
Next, we diagnose three possible irregularities in the distribution of z-statistics of trials, at
or above the 5% significance threshold, corresponding to a z-statistic of 1.96: (1) a spike in the
density function right above 1.96, (2) a discontinuity of the density for values over 1.96, and (3) an
excess mass of significant results in Phase 3 compared to Phase 2. Our findings are as follows:
1. We detect no spikes in the densities (or discontinuities in the distribution functions) right
above 1.96, the salient significance threshold. Such spikes, indicating that results are inflated
to clear the significance hurdle, have been documented in previous studies of z-distributions
for tests in academic publications across life sciences [36] as well as economics [30] and
business studies [37]. Thus, the distribution of z-scores from ClinicalTrials.gov appears
to be more natural and credible compared to results reported for publications in scientific
journals. This lack of egregious evidence of manipulation of results is a reassuring first
piece of good news about the integrity of clinical trials.
2. We investigate the presence of a discontinuity in the density of z-statistics with a test that
relies on a simple local polynomial density estimator [34]. The densities for Phase 2 trials
are smooth and do not show a significant upward shift at the 1.96 threshold in all cases. In
contrast, the densities of z-statistics for industry-sponsored (both small and top ten) Phase
3 trials display a break at 1.96. The break is statistically significant only for Phase 3 tri-
als undertaken by small pharmaceutical companies (panel D), with a persistent upward shift
to the right of the threshold, indicating an abnormal amount of significant results. See SI
Appendix for details. This pattern is suggestive of selective reporting, i.e., strategic conceal-
ment of some non-significant results.
3. Figure 1 indicates an excess mass of favorable results over the 1.96 threshold in Phase 3
compared to Phase 2. More generally the Phase 3 distribution of z-statistics stochastically
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Figure 1: Comparison of Phase 2 and Phase 3 densities of the z-score and tests for disconti-
nuity at z = 1.96, depending on affiliation of lead sponsor. Density estimates of the constructed
z-statistics for primary outcomes of Phase 2 (dashed blue lines) and Phase 3 (solid grey lines) tri-
als. The shaded areas are 95%-confidence bands and the vertical lines at 1.96 correspond to the
threshold for statistical significance at 0.05 level. Sample sizes: A: Phase 2 n = 3,277, Phase 3
n = 3,137; B: Phase 2 n = 984, Phase 3 n = 598; C: Phase 2 n = 1,122, Phase 3 n = 1,122; D:
Phase 2 n = 1,171, Phase 3 n = 1,417. Significance levels for discontinuity tests [34]: * p < 0.1;
** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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dominates the Phase 2 distribution; thus more favorable results are more likely to be observed
in Phase 3 than in Phase 2. Dominance is particularly strong for industry-sponsored trials
(Panels C and D). Even though not as alarming as a spike at the significance threshold,
this pattern appears to be suspicious. Whereas only 36.0% of Phase 2 trial results by non-
industry sponsors fall above 1.96 (and 35.1% respectively for Phase 3, a difference that is
not statistically significant), for industry-sponsored trials the fraction of significant results
rises to 46.7% in Phase 2 and even to 71.0% in Phase 3.
Recall that the analysis above considers only p-values associated to primary outcomes of trials.
These results constitute the main measure for success of the treatment being trialled, for both the
investigators themselves and the evaluating authorities. We provide a similar analysis for p-values
from lower-stake secondary outcomes (Figure S1 and Table S4). The densities for all groups of
sponsors and both phases do not display any discontinuities at the significance threshold. More-
over, the excess mass of significant results from industry-sponsored trials in Phase 3 relative to
Phase 2 is much smaller compared to the distribution for primary outcomes. We find irregularities
only for higher-stake primary outcomes, suggesting that incentives of reporting parties play a role.
Linking Trials across Phases: Controlling for Selective Continuation
The FDA focuses mainly on Phase 3 results when deciding about marketing approval, a decision
with major financial consequences for pharmaceutical companies. Given these incentives, the
observed excess of significant results particularly in the group of industry-sponsored Phase 3 trials
could be interpreted as evidence of tampering (p-hacking) or non-disclosure of negative results
(selective reporting). However, this conclusion would be premature before taking a careful look at
the dynamic incentives underlying clinical research, as we set out to do.
An alternative explanation for the excess mass of significant results in Phase 3 relative to Phase
2 is selective continuation of drug testing to the next phase only when initial results are sufficiently
encouraging. Selective continuation saves on costly clinical research and is thus socially desirable.
Also, from an ethical point of view, no further trials with volunteer patients should be conducted
when a drug is highly unlikely to have a positive impact. We outline such a model of the sponsor’s
continuation decision in Materials and Methods.
To identify the impact of selective continuation, we develop a procedure to link Phase 2 and
Phase 3 trials in our dataset based on the main intervention (i.e., the tested drug or combination
of drugs), the condition to be treated, and the timing. This procedure is illustrated in Figure 2 and
explained in detail in the SI Appendix. A given Phase 2 trial may fall into two different categories:
it may have no corresponding Phase 3 trial with the same intervention and same condition, or it
may have one or multiple matches in Phase 3. The resulting linked data, which we make available
to the research community, is a key input in the methodology we develop to estimate a selection
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Figure 2: Linking Phase 2 and Phase 3 trials. We consider a Phase 2 trial as continued if we
found at least one Phase 3 trial registered in the database (regardless of whether associated results
are reported or not) fulfilling all three criteria. See SI Appendix for a more detailed description of
the linking procedure.
function capturing selective continuation for industry-sponsored trials.
Following our model of the firm’s continuation decision, we estimate the selection function
with a logistic regression of a dummy variable indicating if there is at least one match among
the Phase 3 trials in the database (regardless of whether Phase 3 results are reported or not) on
the Phase 2 z-score. We control for adjustment for multiple hypothesis testing, a time trend, and
other covariates that might influence the perceived persuasiveness of Phase 2 results (square root
of overall enrollment to each trial a proxy for power of the statistical tests, active comparator vs.
placebo) or the economic incentives to undertake research (market size for the treated condition) on
top of the z-score; see Materials and Methods for the exact specification. The predicted values of
this selection function can be interpreted as the probability of a drug moving to Phase 3 conditional
on the information available at the end of Phase 2: the Phase 2 z-score and other covariates.
In most cases, very low p-values are no longer reported precisely but only as being below
the thresholds 0.001 or 0.0001 (e.g. p < 0.001 instead of p = 0.0008). Therefore, we estimate
the continuation probability separately for those two cases by including dummies for ”z > 3.29”
(corresponding to the p-value being reported as p < 0.001) and ”z > 3.89” (corresponding to p <
0.0001) in the specification of the selection function.
Column 1 in Table 1 shows the estimated logit coefficients for all industry sponsored trials. A
higher z-score in Phase 2 significantly increases the probability of continuation to Phase 3. Column
2 and 3 show the results when considering only trials sponsored by small or respectively the ten
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Table 1: Estimates of logit selection function for selective continuation, based on primary
outcomes.
(1) (2) (3)
Sponsor All Small Top 10
industry industry industry
Phase 2 z-score 0.326*** 0.269*** 0.341**
(0.0793) (0.0900) (0.137)
Dummy for Phase 2 z-score reported as ”z > 3.29” 0.979*** 0.765** 1.437***
(0.287) (0.381) (0.436)
Dummy for Phase 2 z-score reported as ”z > 3.89” 1.219*** 0.732 1.788***
(0.354) (0.448) (0.499)
Constant -1.285*** -0.573 -2.745***
(0.422) (0.484) (0.613)
Controls yes yes yes
Observations 3,229 1,640 1,580
No. of trials 940 567 372
Notes: Included controls: square root of the overall enrollment, dummy for placebo comparator, logarithm
of market size, dummy for multiple hypothesis testing adjustment, and post 2011 dummy. Standard errors
in parentheses are clustered at the trial level; significance levels (based on a two-sided t-test): * p < 0.1; **
p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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largest industry sponsors. The estimates exhibit two patterns that suggest that larger companies are
more selective in which research projects to continue. First, the overall share of matched trials is
lower for large industry sponsors, captured by the smaller constant. In the context of our model of
the firm’s continuation decision, the absolute value of the estimated constant can be interpreted as
the opportunity cost of continuing a specific project. This cost is greater for large sponsors with
many alternative projects. Second, the coefficients for the Phase 2 z-score and the two dummies
are larger. Hence, an increase in the Phase 2 z-score leads to a larger increase in the estimated
continuation probability for large sponsors compared to small sponsors.
In Table S5 we report estimates of the same logistic model when considering the Phase 2 z-
scores associated to secondary outcomes instead of primary outcomes. Notwithstanding the much
larger sample size, none of the coefficients for the z-score is statistically significant. This finding
confirms that the evaluation of a trial’s success, and therefore also selective continuation, is based
predominantly on primary outcomes.
Decomposition of the Difference in Significant Results Between Phase 2 and
Phase 3
Under the assumption that, conditional on our control variables, the expected z-statistic in Phase
3 equals the z of a similar Phase 2 trial, we can construct a hypothetical Phase 3 distribution for
primary outcomes accounting for selective continuation. To do so, we estimate the kernel density
of Phase 2 statistics (for now disregarding “z> 3.29” and “z> 3.89”) reweighting each observation
by the continuation probability predicted by our selection function given the characteristics of the
Phase 2 trial. The resulting counterfactual density can be compared to the actual Phase 2 and Phase
3 densities which we estimate using a standard unweighted kernel estimator.
Since the selection function is increasing in the Phase 2 z-score, the counterfactual z-density
rotates counter-clockwise, increasing the share of significant results (see Figure S2). To calculate
the overall share of significant results under the hypothetical regime, we combine the estimated
densities with the number of “z > 3.29” and “z > 3.89” results predicted from the selection func-
tions and renormalize to one.
Based on this construction, we decompose the difference in the share of significant results
in Phase 2 and Phase 3 into two parts: selective continuation and an unexplained residual. As
illustrated in Figure 3 and Table S6, when we consider all industry sponsored trials, selective
continuation, i.e., economizing on the cost of trials that are not promising enough, accounts for
more than half of the difference, leaving unexplained 44.2% of the difference.
Next, we repeat the estimation procedure separately for trials sponsored by large and small in-
dustry. The difference is the share of significant results between Phase 2 and Phase 3 is similar for
both groups (22.7 percentage points for top 10 industry vs. 22.4 percentage points for small indus-
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Figure 3: Selection-based decomposition of the difference in significant results from primary
outcomes between Phase 2 and Phase 3, depending on affiliation of lead sponsor. Phase 2 and
3 lines represent the shares of trials with a p-value below 5 percent (or equivalently a z-score above
1.96). The green segments represent the parts of the differences explained by selective continua-
tion, based on counterfactuals constructed from the Phase 2 distribution. For precise numbers and
sample sizes see Table S6. Significance levels for the differences (based on a two-sided t-test): *
p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
try). However, trials sponsored by the ten largest companies report a smaller share of significant
results in both Phase 2 (45.0% vs. 53.2%) and Phase 3 (67.4% vs. 75.9%). The difference between
the prediction controlled for selective continuation and actual Phase 3 shrinks to 2.8 percentage
points and is not statistically significant anymore. Thus, for top 10 industry sponsors selective
continuation can explain almost the entire difference and our methodology suggests no indication
of selective reporting or potential tampering.
To the contrary, as already suggested by the estimates of the selection function, for small spon-
sors selective continuation is less pronounced and can account for only 32.5% of the difference
between Phase 2 and Phase 3. For small sponsors, we are left with a statistically significant unex-
plained residual of 15.3 percentage points. Recall that this is also the only group of sponsors for
which the Phase 3 z-density exhibits a statistically significant discontinuity at the 1.96 threshold.
Discussion
Overall, the distribution of z-scores from ClinicalTrials.gov does not reveal egregious evidence
for manipulation of results reported to the registry. However, the residual of excessive significant
Phase 3 results unexplained by our methodology might be attributed to some selective reporting
(withholding unfavorable studies entirely), or tampering with the data, or p-hacking (withholding
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single unfavorable results). The fact that this suspicious pattern, like the discontinuity in the Phase
3 density at 1.96, appears especially for smaller sponsors is consistent with economic incentives.
Similar patterns have been found for manipulation of online reviews for hotels, depending on
whether they are affiliated to large chains [38].
Larger companies should naturally be more concerned about their reputation, as they have more
to lose in case they get caught with shady practices. Consequently, their incentives to report results
completely and truthfully are stronger than for the fringe, which is potentially less concerned about
reputational losses associated with allegations of selective reporting or tampering. These incentives
are also reflected in the internal disclosure policies that most large companies have established in
recent years.
Our results suggest that reputational concerns can mitigate short-run economic incentives that
potentially undermine integrity in reporting the results of clinical research. These findings con-
tribute to the understanding of the efficient organization of science and the research process more
generally [39–43]. Reputational concerns can be sufficient to discipline larger organizations,
whereas smaller organizations might need additional regulatory supervision. To conclude, dis-
closure regulations of clinical research should pay particular attention to smaller industry sponsors
for whom the discipline of reputational concerns has less bite.
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Materials and Methods
Database for Aggregate Analysis of ClinicalTrials.gov (AACT)
The Database for Aggregate Analysis of ClinicalTrials.gov (AACT) was launched in September
2010 to extend the ability of researchers to use the ClinicalTrials.gov data [19–21]. The database
aggregates all the data of the registry and makes it available for free bulk download. The project is
administered by the Clinical Trials Transformation Initiative (CTTI), a partnership of the FDA and
Duke University with the aim of improving quality and efficiency of clinical trials. The database,
which is updated daily and directly accessible in the cloud, contains 43 sub-tables with informa-
tion on timing, conditions, interventions, facilities, locations, sponsors, investigators, responsible
authorities, eligible participants, outcome measures, adverse events, results, and descriptions of
the trials.
The trials in the database cover a wide range of different diseases, interventions, and study de-
signs. Hence, also the reported results are very diverse in nature. In contrast to a meta-analysis on a
specific disease or treatment, which typically uses only a narrowly defined subgroup of the dataset,
we analyze the largest possible portion of the data on an aggregate level. Given the aggregate level
of the analysis, rather than using the estimated coefficients, we focus on p-values, the only mea-
sures reported uniformly and comparably for many trials, independent of their characteristics and
the statistical method used for the analysis.
For the study, we use the AACT database as of August 14, 2018. We concentrate on Phase 2
and Phase 3 interventional (as opposed to observational) superiority (as opposed to non-inferiority)
studies on drugs (as opposed to medical devices and others) which report at least one proper p-value
for a statistical test on a primary outcome of the trial.
We drop the trials of the sponsor Colgate Palmolive which reported p-values exactly equal to
0.05 for 137 out of its 150 results. We attribute these exact p-values of 0.05 to a reporting mistake;
clearly these were intended to be reported as significant results with p-value lower or equal to 0.05.
Leaving Colgate Palmolive’s results in the sample would lead to a substantial spike at z = 1.96
which could be wrongly interpreted as evidence for p-hacking.
Altogether, we obtain a sample of 10,678 p-values from tests performed on primary outcomes
of 4,237 trials. These single p-values constitute the units of observation for our analysis. The
average number of p-values for primary outcomes per trial is 2.52 (standard deviation 4.62). As a
consequence of the FDA Amendments Act (FDAAA), the largest part of our results data pertains to
trials conducted after 2007.
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p-z Transformation
We transform the p-values taken from the AACT database to corresponding z-statistics by suppos-
ing that all p-values would originate from a two-sided Z-test of a null hypothesis that the drug has
the same effect as the comparison. Given that under the null hypothesis this statistic is normally
distributed, we have the one-to-one correspondence z = −Φ−1( p2 ), where z is the absolute value
of the test-statistic and Φ−1 is the inverse of the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
More details can be found in the SI Appendix.
Density Discontinuity Tests
We implement tests of discontinuity in the z-score density at the z = 1.96 significance threshold
based on the state-of-the-art procedure developed by Cattaneo, Jansson, and Ma [34]. This test
builds on a local polynomial density estimation technique that avoids pre-binning of the data.
More details on the testing procedure and supplementary results can be found in the SI Appendix.
Linking Phase 2 and Phase 3 Trials
To analyze selective continuation from Phase 2 to Phase 3, we link the Phase 2 trials in our dataset
for which we have results to Phase 3 trials.
We read one by one the protocols for all the Phase 2 trials in the dataset for which p-values
are reported and which were completed before 2018. With this restriction on the completion date,
there could potentially be a follow-up registered before August 2018. This method allowed us to
determine for 1,461 trials the main experimental intervention(s), i.e., the main drug or combination
of drugs whose efficacy and safety is to be established. As conditions for the matching we use the
MeSH terms determined by the curators for the purpose of making the ClinicalTrials.gov webpage
searchable [21], disregarding overly generic categories such as simply “Disease”. We consider a
Phase 2 trial as matched if we found at least one Phase 3 trial registered in the database (regardless
of whether associated results are reported or not) fulfilling all of the following criteria:
1. All drugs being part of at least one of the determined main interventions of the Phase 2 trial
appear as listed interventions in the Phase 3 trial. This is either with exactly the same name
or with a synonym which the reporting party states to refer to the same drug.
2. All the MeSH-conditions associated with the Phase 2 trial are also associated with the Phase
3 trial.
3. The start date of the Phase 2 trial was before the start date of the Phase 3 trial.
For more details on the linking procedure, see SI Appendix.
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Selection Function
Denote by I2 a vector collecting the relevant information pertaining to the clinical trial at the end of
Phase 2. It contains the z-score, zPh2, and other variables describing the circumstances of the trial
(such as sample size to proxy for statistical power). If the firm decides to stop the development of
the drug it gets a payoff of V (I2) and an unobserved payoff η . In case of continuation into Phase
3, the firm pays a development cost c+η , where η is only observable to the firm. The future
payoff is denoted V Ph3 and is increasing in the Phase 3 z-score, which is uncertain at the time of
the decision to set up a Phase 3 trial. The firm has an expectation on the distribution of the z-score,
based on the information available in I2. The decision of the firm is thus
V Ph2(I2) = max
[
V (I2)+η ;−c−η+δEz3|I2V Ph3(z3)
]
,
where δ is the discount factor. Assuming that the unobserved cost shocks η and η are both iid and
extreme value distributed, the probability of undertaking a Phase 3 trial is a logistic function [44]
Prob(continuation) =
exp(−c+δEz3|I2V Ph3(z3))
exp(V (I2))+ exp(−c+δEz3|I2V Ph3(z3))
= logistic(I2).
Following this model, we use a logistic regression to estimate a selection function that captures
selective continuation for industry-sponsored trials. In the sample of Phase 2 z-scores, restricted
as explained in the section above, we estimate the logistic model
continuationi = logistic
[
α+β0(1−D1i−D2i)zPh2i +β1D1i+β2D2i+x′iγ+ εi
]
,
where continuationi is a dummy variable which results from our linking of trials across phases
and equals one if there is at least one Phase 3 trial matched to Phase 2 trial to which z-score i
belongs (regardless of whether results are reported), and zPh2i is the Phase 2 z-score associated to
a primary outcome. D1i and D2i are dummy variables for a statistic to be reported as “z > 3.29”
or “z > 3.89”, respectively. As explained above, those cases are so frequent that we treat them
separately.
Moreover, the vector xi gathers further control variables which might influence the perceived
persuasiveness of Phase 2 results or the economic incentives to carry on with the research on top of
the z-score. These include the square root of the overall enrollment to each trial (as proxy for the
power of the tests), a dummy indicating whether there was a placebo involved in the trial (as op-
posed to an active comparator), the logarithm of the market size for different classes of conditions
(determined from the total Medicare D expenditure), and a dummy indicating whether the p-value
is explicitly declared as adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing. For the last variable, the baseline
corresponds to no adjustment of the critical value of the testing procedure or no information pro-
vided. We codified this variable manually from the p-value descriptions; only 2.9% of the relevant
observations are explicitly adjusted.
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As registration of trials and reporting of results occurs often with a substantial time lag, we also
control for a time trend by including a dummy variable indicating whether the trial was completed
after 2011.
Summing up, zPh2,D1,D2, and x correspond to I2, the information relevant for the continuation
decision at the end of Phase 2, in the model above. The predicted values ̂continuationi can be
interpreted as the probability of a drug moving to Phase 3 conditional on the Phase 2 z-score (and
other informative covariates observable at the end of Phase 2).
Kernel Density Estimation
Let Z1,Z2, . . . ,Zn be the sample of z-score in a given group of trials. To estimate the density we
use the standard weighted kernel estimator
fˆ (z) =
1
W
n
∑
i=1
wi
h
K
(
z−Zi
h
)
,
where W = ∑ni=1 wi, K(·) is the Epanechnikov kernel function, and h the bandwidth which we
choose with the Sheather-Jones plug-in estimator [45]. To estimate the actual Phase 2 and Phase 3
densities, we set all weights wi equal to one. To construct the hypothetical densities controlled for
selective continuation, we estimate the kernel density of the Phase 2 statistics, using the predicted
probabilities from our selection function as weights, i.e. wi = ̂continuationi. The resulting densities
for precisely reported (i.e., not as inequality) test statistics by different groups of sponsors are
plotted in Figure S2.
This procedure is similar in spirit to the weight function approach used to test for publication
bias in meta-analyses [46], but it allows the weights to depend on more than one variable. The
construction of counterfactual distributions by weighted kernel density estimation has also been
used in other strands of the economics literature, e.g., for the decomposition of the effects of
institutional and labor market factors on the distribution of wages [47].
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Supporting Information (SI)
Figure S1: Comparison of Phase 2 and Phase 3 z-score distributions and test for a discon-
tinuity at z = 1.96 for secondary outcomes, depending on affiliation of lead sponsor. Density
estimates of the constructed z-statistics for tests on secondary outcomes of Phase 2 (dashed blue
lines) and Phase 3 (solid grey lines) trials. The shaded areas are 95%-confidence bands and the
vertical lines at 1.96 correspond to the threshold for statistical significance at 0.05 level. Sample
sizes: A: Phase 2 n = 15,219, Phase 3 n = 20,832; B: Phase 2 n = 2,118, Phase 3 n = 1,652; C:
Phase 2 n = 7,071, Phase 3 n = 8,587; D: Phase 2 n = 6,030, Phase 3 n = 10,593. Significance
levels for discontinuity tests [34]: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Figure S2: Kernel density estimates for Phase 2 and Phase 3 z-scores and constructed coun-
terfactuals accounting for selective continuation , depending on affiliation of lead sponsor.
Estimated densities based only on p-values which are reported precisely (i.e. not as inequality).
Shorthand notation: Ph2=Phase 2, Ph3=Phase 3, and SC=selective continuation. Sample sizes:
A: Ph2 n = 2,293, Ph3 n = 2,539; B: Ph2 n = 1,171, Ph3 n = 1,417; C: Ph2 n = 1,122, Ph3
n = 1,122.
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Table S1: Market size for treated conditions from total Medicare D spending.
MeSH Total Medicare D
code Category Spending in 2011
in bn US$
C14 Cardiovascular Diseases 13.215
F03 Mental Disorders 12.336
C18 Nutritional and Metabolic Diseases 8.957
C19 Endocrine System Diseases 8.45
C10 Nervous System Diseases 5.956
C08/C09 Respiratory Tract Diseases/Otorhinolaryngologic Disease 5.945
C06 Digestive System Diseases 4.377
C02 Virus Diseases 3.195
C05 Musculoskeletal Diseases 2.888
C04 Neoplasms 2.64
C12/C13 Male Urogenital Diseases/ 2.262
Female Urogenital Diseases and Pregnancy Complications
C20 Immune System Diseases 1.355
C01 Bacterial Infections and Mycoses 1.216
C11 Eye Diseases 1.163
C23 Pathological Conditions, Signs and Symptoms 0.812
C17 Skin and Connective Tissue Diseases 0.683
C15 Hemic and Lymphatic Diseases 0.343
C25 Chemically-Induced Disorders 0.17
C16 Congenital, Hereditary, and Neonatal Diseases and Abnormalities 0.101
C26 Wounds and Injuries 0.049
C03 Parasitic Diseases 0.032
Notes: Details of the calculations provided in the SI Appendix.
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Table S2: P-values for tests of density discontinuity at the z = 1.96 threshold.
(1) (2)
Sponsor Phase 2 Phase 3
All 0.43 0.14
(3,277) (3,137)
Non-industry 0.50 0.37
(984) (598)
All industry 0.66 0.34
(2,293) (2,539)
Small industry 0.82 0.021**
(1,171) (1,417)
Top 10 industry 0.83 0.24
(1,122) (1,122)
Notes: P-values result from the density discontinuity test [34], described in detail in the SI Appendix, for
primary outcomes; significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 . Sample sizes in parentheses.
Table S3: Size of discontinuities in the z-density at the significance threshold, as well as at
z = 2.01 and z = 2.46, for industry-sponsored Phase 3 trials.
(1) (2) (3)
Sponsor \Cutoff value z=1.96 z=2.01 z=2.46
All industry 0.055 0.044 0.085
Small industry 0.195** 0.122 0.109
Top 10 industry -0.102 -0.017 0.016
Notes: Differences of the bias-corrected density estimates to the right and to the left of the respective
cutoff, resulting from the density discontinuity test [34], described in detail in the SI Appendix, for primary
outcomes. Sample sizes: All industry n = 2,539, Small industry n = 1,417, Top 10 industry n = 1,122.
Significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table S4: P-values for tests of density discontinuity at the z=1.96 threshold – secondary out-
comes.
(1) (2)
Sponsor Phase 2 Phase 3
All 0.29 0.31
(15,219) (20,832)
Non-industry 0.48 0.52
(2,118) (1,652)
All industry 0.24 0.18
(13,101) (19,180)
Small industry 0.58 0.48
(6,030) (10,593)
Top 10 industry 0.45 0.71
(7,071) (8,587)
Notes: P-values result from the density discontinuity test [34], described in detail in the SI Appendix, for
secondary outcomes; significance levels: * p< 0.1; ** p< 0.05; *** p< 0.01. Sample sizes in parentheses.
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Table S5: Estimates of logit selection function for selective continuation, based on secondary
outcomes.
(1) (2) (3)
Sponsor All Small Top 10
industry industry industry
Phase 2 z-score 0.106 0.168 -0.0475
(0.0874) (0.107) (0.145)
Dummy for Phase 2 z-score reported as “z > 3.29” 0.550 0.757 0.159
(0.481) (0.515) (0.633)
Dummy for Phase 2 z-score reported as “z > 3.89” 0.676 0.276 0.553
(0.446) (0.573) (0.714)
Constant -0.959 -0.662 -1.865**
(0.682) (0.811) (0.907)
Controls yes yes yes
Observations 14,704 6,810 7,894
No. of trials 587 349 238
Notes: Included controls: square root of the overall enrollment, dummy for placebo comparator, logarithm
of market size, dummy for multiple hypothesis testing adjustment, and post 2011 dummy. Standard errors
in parentheses are clustered at the trial level; significance levels (based on a two-sided t-test): * p < 0.1; **
p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table S6: Selection-based decomposition of the difference in significant results from primary
outcomes between Phase 2 and Phase 3, depending on affiliation of lead sponsor.
Share of significant results
(1) (2) (3)
Sponsor All Small Top 10
industry industry industry
[Ph2] 0.493 0.532 0.450
(0.00777) (0.0114) (0.0133)
[Ph3] 0.724 0.759 0.674
(0.00591) (0.00680) (0.00969)
[Ph2+SC] 0.622 0.606 0.645
(0.0188) (0.0275) (0.0527)
Differences
(4) (5) (6)
Sponsor All Small Top 10
industry industry industry
[Ph3]-[Ph2] 0.231*** 0.227*** 0.224***
(0.00966) (0.0133) (0.0167)
[Ph3]-[Ph2+SC] 0.102*** 0.153*** 0.0284
(0.0201) (0.0283) (0.0536)
[Ph2+SC]-[Ph2] 0.129*** 0.0738*** 0.195***
(0.0175) (0.0255) (0.0511)
Observations 8,700 4,917 3,783
Observations Ph2 3,477 1,838 1,639
Observations Ph3 5,223 3,079 2,144
No. of trials Ph2 1,027 632 395
No. of trials Ph3 2,276 1,376 900
Notes: Columns 1-3 display the share of significant results based on kernel density estimates and adjustment
for selection, with shorthand notation Ph2=Phase 2, Ph3=Phase 3, and SC=selective continuation. Columns
4-6 display the differences in these shares. The standard errors in parentheses are obtained by bootstrapping
the whole estimation procedure (500 repetitions); significance levels (based on a two-sided t-test): * p< 0.1;
** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Market Size Data
To obtain a proxy for the expected market size for a newly developed drug, we evaluate the Medi-
care D spending for existing drugs in 2011 according to information from the Centers for Medi-
care & Medicaid Services publicly available at https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-
and-Systems/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems.html. Part D Prescription Drug Event (PDE)
data is provided for a subset (∼ 70%) of Medicare beneficiaries.
We classify manually 1,056 marketed drugs, among which the 420 with the highest Medicare
D spending, into the MeSH categories for the treated conditions. Some strongly overlapping cate-
gories have been merged. Overall, these drugs make up for 90% of the expenditure on the drugs in
the dataset. Table S1 shows the total spending for those categories.
The MeSH categorization allows us to connect these numbers to the trials in the ClinicalTri-
als.gov registry. In case a trial is associated with more than one category, we assign it to the one
with the highest spending. The trials for which the MeSH categorization is missing (207 trials) are
assigned the mean market size of the remaining sample.
p-z Transformation
Our analysis focuses on the reported p-values for the statistical evaluation of the results of the trials.
However, the p-distribution is not ideal for graphical representation, given that the most interesting
part of the distribution is the region around the classical significance threshold of 0.05. A proper
analysis of this part requires zooming in on the distribution for small p-values (say < 0.1). It is
also important to compare the overall p-distributions for different groups of trials. For instance, a
clockwise rotation of the density represents a higher share of more significant results. To overcome
this problem, we transform the p-values to corresponding z-statistics by supposing that all p-values
would originate from a two-sided Z-test of a null hypothesis that the drug has the same effect as
the comparison. Given that under the null hypothesis this statistic is normally distributed, we have
the one-to-one correspondence z =−Φ−1( p2 ), where z is the absolute value of the test-statistic and
Φ−1 is the inverse of the standard normal cumulative distribution function. This transformation
“stretches” the distribution from support [0,1] to the whole positive real axis and it does so the
more the smaller the original p-value. Hence, the part around the significant threshold becomes
more prominent without losing the other parts of the distribution. A similar transformation has
been applied in previous literature on experimental biases across life sciences [36].
Note that the p-values in the dataset originate from diverse statistical procedures (e.g., AN-
COVA, ANOVA, Chi-squared-test, mixed models analysis, linear regression, logistic regression,
1-sided t-test, 2-sided t-test, etc.), with test statistics that follow different distributions, some con-
tinuous, some discrete. Even though the sample size of the trials is sufficiently large that, ac-
cording to the Central Limit Theorem, many of the resulting statistics are approximately normally
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distributed, in general the actual test-statistic of the trial and our calculated z do not coincide.
Nevertheless, the p-z transformation allows us to conveniently compare the results of all trials.
Beyond the graphical aspect, another advantage of looking at z-statistics instead of p-values is
that in the usual process of statistical inference the test statistic precedes the p-value. Hence, one
can expect that the test statistic is a more immediate object for selection or potential tampering by
the researchers. For this reason, we use the z-transformation also for our estimation of the selection
functions and the share of significant results.
The Missing Tail of the z-Distribution
Not all p-values in the registry are reported precisely, but some are only stated in comparison to
a certain threshold, e.g. p < 0.05 or p > 0.1. Whereas for most parts of the distribution this is a
minor issue and affects only a small number of observations, relative reporting becomes the rule
for very low p-values, corresponding to high z-statistics. In particular, 39.9% of the p-values in
our sample of tests for primary outcomes are reported as p < 0.001 (corresponding to z > 3.29)
or p < 0.0001 (corresponding to z > 3.89). There are barely any p-values reported with equality
below these thresholds. For the z-distribution, this implies that we know the size of the right tail
(i.e., the mass above a certain threshold) but we do not have any information about the exact shape.
For our analysis of the share of significant results, we deal with this issue as following. As indi-
cated in the regression equation, we include the dummies D1 for “z > 3.29” and D2 for “z > 3.89”
into the estimation of the selection function, so that the probability of continuation is estimated
separately for those two cases. Moreover, we include p-values which are reported as exactly zero
(as a result of rounding) and hence cannot be transformed into a z-score in the group D2. For the
few cases in which a z-score is reported as inequality with respect to a level z¯ other than 3.29 and
3.89, we replace the respective z with the mean of the precisely reported z-statistics conditional on
being above or respectively below z¯.
For the discontinuity tests (Figure 1, Figure S1, Table S2, Table S3 and Table S4) and plots of
densities (Figure S2), we consider only p-values which are reported precisely (i.e., not as inequal-
ity).
Testing for Discontinuities of Distributions and Densities of z-scores
We provide a formal test of discontinuity in the z-score density at the z = 1.96 significance thresh-
old. We implement manipulation tests based on a state-of-the-art procedure developed by Catta-
neo, Jansson, and Ma [34]. This test builds on a local polynomial density estimation technique that
avoids pre-binning of the data . Table S2 shows the p-values of the tests performed on the densities
from primary outcomes, depending on the affiliation of the lead sponsors of the trials, as described
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in the main text. We do not find any evidence of manipulation for trials in Phase 2. For Phase 3,
the p-values are lower, but only significant for trials sponsored by small industry.
Figure 1 in the main text suggests that the breaks we find are not due to a spike, i.e., a concen-
tration of mass right above 1.96 (leading to a discontinuity in both the density and the cumulative
distribution function), but due to a persistent upward shift in the density with an increased fre-
quency of results also further to the right of 1.96 (leading to a discontinuity only in the density but
not in the cumulative distribution function). To reinforce this claim and distinguish the two cases,
we perform further density discontinuity tests with cutoffs 0.05 and 0.5 above the significance
threshold, corresponding to z = 2.01 and z = 2.46, for the group of which we found to display a
break at 1.96, i.e., for the industry-sponsored Phase 3 trials.
With this method we can implicitly test for a discontinuity in the cumulative distribution func-
tion. If the discontinuity in the density was due to a spike at 1.96, we would expect our test to find
a downward jump in the density at some point above. If there was manipulation and all inflated re-
sults were concentrated exactly at 1.96 (sharp discontinuity in the cumulative distribution function
at 1.96), we should have a sharp downward discontinuity in the density right above the threshold
(captured by the test at 2.01). Assuming more realistically that investigators want to push their
results above the significance threshold but cannot perfectly target a p-value of 0.05, we would
expect an excess mass above 1.96 that slowly vanishes (captured by the test at 2.46). Even in the
absence of a sharp discontinuity, also in this case we would expect a downward tendency in the
density.
The differences of the bias-corrected density estimates to the right and to the left of the re-
spective cutoffs tabulated in Table S3 do not display such a downward tendency. To the contrary,
for small industry sponsors, the differences at 2.01 and 2.46 get smaller and are not statistically
significant anymore, but have still a positive sign. These findings confirm that there is a persisting
upward shift in the density around the significance threshold, but there is no break in the cumulative
distribution function with an excess mass concentrated only right above 1.96.
Similar discontinuity tests for the z-density from secondary outcomes do not display any break
at the significance threshold (Figure S1 and Table S4). Moreover, the excess mass of significant
results from industry-sponsored trials in Phase 3 relative to Phase 2 is much smaller compared to
the distribution for primary outcomes.
Linking Phase 2 and Phase 3 Trials
To analyze selective continuation from Phase 2 to Phase 3, we link the Phase 2 trials in our dataset
for which we have results to Phase 3 trials. We match Phase 2 and Phase 3 trials based on the
specific drug or combination of drugs (in medical terms intervention) the trial investigates for the
treatment of a specific disease (in medical terms condition). This is not such a straightforward
exercise to implement for two reasons:
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• The dataset is a mere digitization of the reported trial protocols. Hence, most variables are
not well codified and have non-generic entries. Moreover, even though the information on
interventions and conditions of the trials for which results are reported is rather complete, the
cells in the reporting forms are interpreted in varying ways by different investigators. For in-
stance, in the specification of a trial’s intervention, in many cases all the drugs involved in the
trial are inserted in one cell, without specifying whether the drugs are given as a combination
or separately to different arms of the trial. Often, it is not specified which drug constitutes
the experimental treatment rather than the control. Hence, it is not possible to mechanically
identify a trial’s main experimental intervention. As an additional complication, many drugs
appear in the data with different names; some times the drugs are referred by the chemical
composition, while other times by their commercial name.
• The process of drug development is not linear in the sense that we usually do not have one
Phase 2 trial followed by one Phase 3 trial and then a request for FDA approval. In most
cases, there is a number of Phase 2 trials looking at similar but potentially slightly different
interventions/conditions, such as different drug dosages, different characteristics of eligible
patients, or different control interventions. These Phase 2 trials are followed by an even
larger number of Phase 3 trials with similar interventions/conditions but slightly varying
specifications.
We address these hurdles in the following way. We read one by one the protocols for all
the Phase 2 trials in the dataset for which p-values are reported and which were completed before
2018. With this restriction on the completion date, there could potentially be a follow-up registered
before August 2018. This method allowed us to determine for 1,461 trials the main experimental
intervention(s), i.e., the main drug or combination of drugs whose efficacy and safety is to be
established. As conditions for the matching we use the MeSH terms determined by the curators for
the purpose of making the ClinicalTrials.gov webpage searchable [21], disregarding overly generic
categories such as simply “Disease”. We consider a Phase 2 trial as matched if we found at least
one Phase 3 trial registered in the database (regardless of whether associated results are reported
or not) fulfilling all of the following criteria:
1. All drugs being part of at least one of the determined main interventions of the Phase 2 trial
appear as listed interventions in the Phase 3 trial. This is either with exactly the same name
or with a synonym which the reporting party states to refer to the same drug.
2. All the MeSH-conditions associated with the Phase 2 trial are also associated with the Phase
3 trial.
3. The start date of the Phase 2 trial was before the start date of the Phase 3 trial.
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This linking is not perfect, for instance because it disregards whether all the drugs in the Phase
3 trial were part of one combination in one arm. Moreover, we do not take into consideration other
potentially important details of the trials like the exact population of eligible patients. However,
given the limitations of the data, this procedure appears reasonably accurate. We manage to link
34.9% of the industry-sponsored Phase 2 trials in our restricted dataset to at least one Phase 3 trial.
These numbers are roughly in line with the ones reported in previous studies [4] and on the FDA
webpage [48]. For non-industry sponsored trials, however, reporting in Phase 3 is very meager
and we can find Phase 3 matches for only 17.1% of the Phase 2 trials. Given this low number and
the fact that there are no significant differences between the Phase 2 and Phase 3 distribution for
non-industry sponsors to begin with, we investigate selection only for industry-sponsored trials.
Note that criterion 3 considers only the start dates of the trials. It might appear to be more
intuitive to require the completion date of the Phase 2 trial to be prior to the start date of the Phase
3 trial. Indeed, most of our linked trials fulfill also this stronger condition. However, in some cases
this condition is too strong. That is, some Phase 3 trials start before the corresponding Phase 2 trials
are fully completed. For instance, some Phase 2 results on long-run impacts might still be pending
but the collected evidence is already strong enough for the investigators to start a Phase 3 trial.
Moreover, we consider the reported start dates to be more reliable. The responsible parties might
have incentives to report a later completion date than the actual, in order to meet the requirements
for timely reporting of results.
Background on ClinicalTrials.gov
ClinicalTrials.gov is an online registry of clinical research studies in human volunteers. The web-
site is maintained by the National Library of Medicine (NLM) at the National Institutes of Health
(NIH) in collaboration with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). It was established in
February 2000 with the aim to increase transparency in clinical research. Initially, the registry
contained only trials to test the efficacy of new experimental drugs for serious or life-threatening
diseases or conditions and registration was mainly voluntary. For more information on the his-
tory of the registry, related policies, and laws, see https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/about-site/history
(accessed Jun 23, 2017).
In 2007 the requirements for registration of trials were extended substantially through the FDA
Amendments Act (FDAAA) [49]. Even though in January 2017 those rules have been redefined
more precisely [50], in the following we will refer to the regulation of Section 801 of the FDAAA
which was the legislation in force at the time when the great majority of the data in our analysis was
generated. The main criteria a trial must meet to be affected by this regulation are the following:
• initiated after September 27, 2007, or initiated on or before that date and still ongoing as of
December 26, 2007;
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• controlled clinical investigation of drugs, biologics or medical devices other than Phase 1
trials and small feasibility studies;
• the trial has one or more sites in the United States or it involves drugs, biologics or medical
devices manufactured in the United States.
For more details see https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/manage-recs/fdaaa (accessed Jun 23, 2017).
If these criteria apply, the responsible party (i.e., the sponsor or the principal investigator of the
trial) must register the trial and provide the required information no later than 21 days after enroll-
ment of the first participant. In case the investigated drug, biologic, or device is approved, licensed,
or cleared by FDA, moreover, the responsible party must submit some basic summary results of the
trial no later than twelve months after the completion date. For this purpose, in September 2008,
ClinicalTrials.gov was extended by a publicly accessible results database. Thereby, an even higher
level of transparency is supposed to be reached, even though there are still many loopholes in the
legislation [18]. For instance, the required level of details of the results is not clearly defined and
also the aforementioned exemptions for Phase 1 studies and not-approved products are criticized.
In all the other cases that do not meet the stated criteria, registering and reporting of results is
voluntary.
The FDAAA establishes penalties for non-compliance of up to $10,000 per day. However, no
enforcement has yet occurred [51, 52]. Assessing compliance rates is not easy because the afore-
mentioned exemptions and imprecisions in the FDAAA legislation complicate identifying which
trials are applicable. An early algorithm-based study [51] shows that only 13.4% of applicable
clinical trials registered on ClinicalTrials.gov between 2008 and 2012 reported results in a timely
fashion and only 38.3% reported results at any time at all. However, in a manual review of a sub-
sample of trials the same authors [51] found that their methodology based on assumptions about the
approval status of the drug tended to underestimate reporting rates. More recent studies document
for a sample of 329 industry-sponsored Phase 2-4 US trials completed or terminated 2007-2009 a
result reporting rate to ClinicalTrials.gov of 58% by December 2014 [53] and an increase of the
overall reporting rate for applicable trials from 58% to 72% in the last two years until September
2017, driven not by fear of sanctions but by public pressure on the responsible parties [52].
Considering the missing enforcement of the FDAAA regulations, lack of reporting does not
necessarily mean that the responsible parties intend to hide their results, but rather that they just
do not take the time to go through the lengthy reporting process. In this light, notwithstanding the
legal requirements, for the purpose of our analysis reporting of results should be seen as mostly
voluntary.
Since January 2017 the improved “Final Rule” is in place (hence, it does not affect the great
majority of the trials we analyze), addressing many loopholes and broadening the scope of the
2007 legislation [50]. However, the FDA’s efforts to police compliance are still very limited [52].
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Beyond the disclosure mandate, the FDAAA raised public awareness about the importance of trans-
parency in clinical research and led many large pharmaceutical companies and research institutions
to develop internal disclosure policies [51, 52].
Several studies in the medical literature assess the quality of the data reported to the registry and
the results database along different dimension, e.g., information about scientific leadership [54],
consistency of reported primary outcomes [55, 56], comparisons to results published in academic
journals [53, 57], and the provision of Individual Participant Data (IPD) [58]. All these studies, as
well as overall assessments by the curators of the database [19, 20], find ambiguous results and see
scope for improvement [59].
The Database for Aggregate Analysis of ClinicalTrials.gov (AACT) was launched in Septem-
ber 2010 to extend the ability of researchers to use the ClinicalTrials.gov data [19–21]. The
database aggregates all the data of the registry and makes it available for free bulk download.
The biggest challenge when working with the data is that, as a mere digitization of the trial
protocols, most variables have non-generic entries and many of them contain large bodies of text.
Moreover, when looking at the data more carefully, it turns out that the reporting parties do not
always interpret the different cells in the reporting form in the same way. For instance, when it
comes to specifying the intervention of a trial, in many cases all the drugs involved in a trial are
inserted in one cell without specifying whether they are given as a combination or separately to
different arms of the trial. Furthermore, the way in which reporting parties indicate which drug
constitutes the experimental treatment and which one the control is not uniform. Often, one can
find a clarification in other parts of the protocol. Similar issues arise with almost all the reported
variables. Even though for some trials the reported content is complete and when reading the whole
study protocol embedded in the context gives a clear picture, reporting is often made in different
cells making it almost impossible to evaluate large parts of the data mechanically at an aggregate
level, even with natural language processing algorithms.
Consequently, we are forced to either codify the data by hand (like the main intervention of
Phase 2 trials which we use for our linking of trials across phases) or restrict attention to char-
acteristics that are codified uniformly among all the trials in the database. The latter is the case
for numerical entries or entries that allow only for a finite, pre-specified number of answers (e.g.,
binary variables).
To facilitate the browsing of the database, the administrators ran natural language processing
algorithms on the descriptions of trials to match interventions and conditions with Medical Subject
Heading (MeSH) terms [21]. The MeSH thesaurus is a controlled list of vocabulary produced by
the National Library of Medicine and used for indexing, cataloging, and searching for biomedical
and health-related information. It is the standard for classification in medical research. We use the
MeSH terms assigned for the conditions to classify trials. We also use this classification to link
trials across different phases and for the determination of the market size.
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